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Summaiy 
This paper attempts to incorporate the concept of trust in the subsector approach. 
The case study focuses on transactions between small enterprises and market 
agents in the footwear subsector of Agra, India. Such vertical linkages are 
characterised by a mix of three principles of coordination: market, hierarchy and 
cooperation, in which opportunistic behaviour is restrained respectively through 
prices, authority and trust. It is argued that the importance of trust increases in 
transactions for higher market segments. Moreover, the socio-cultural chasm 
between 'makers' and 'sellers' of footwear in Agra frustrates the development of 
trust based on personal characteristics. 
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1. Introduction 
The subsector approach to small enterprise research is clearly spelled out in a 
recent publication in World Development (Boomgard et al. 1992). In their 
concluding remarks Boomgard et al. (1992) mention that variables such as the 
importance of trust and the need to minimize opportunistic behaviour, are very 
difficult to evaluate and that our understanding of these variables within the 
subsector approach is still in its infancy. 
In this paper an attempt is made to take the argument one step further, and to 
incorporate the concept of trust in the subsector approach. This is illustrated with 
an example of the footwear industry in Agra, India. In Section two the concept of 
trust is incorporated into one of the main foundations of the subsector approach, 
the New Institutional Economics. Section three deals with the case study of 
footwear in Agra, India, and shows how the importance of trust varies by market 
channel. Section four contains some concluding remarks. 
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2. Trust in vertical linkages 
The subsector approach focuses on product flows. It analyses small enterprises as 
part of larger marketing and production chains (Boomgard et al. 1992). Small 
producers procure inputs from a variety of suppliers, transform these materials into 
finished or intermediate products and market this output again to a variety of 
buyers. The marketing and production chains aggregated for a specific set of 
products form a subsector system, which can be visualized as a flow chart. Within 
such a subsector map one can often discern certain bottlenecks or nodes. Such 
system nodes are defined as: "... points at which large volumes of product pass 
through a few hands or restricted geographical space." (Boomgard et al. 1992: 201). 
One of the main innovations of the subsector approach is its focus on these system 
nodes. Such nodes can be wholesale markets for finished products, but they can just 
as well be big buyers of final or intermediate products. In this paper firms that can 
be identified as system nodes, are referred to as leading firms. 
A leading firm, whether a 'pure' trading company or a firm involved in both trade 
and production, can control an entire chain by setting the boundary conditions for 
production and marketing of the final product. Through superior access to 
information and resources, leading firms can determine product specifications and 
set price ranges in accordance with the selected market segments. Leading firms 
decide whether and when to use distinct categories of small enterprises. They exert 
control over small enterprises by fixing standards for inputs and outputs, they might 
provide materials and equipment, and sometimes offer advance payments for 
production. In such cases leading firms can make small enterprises entirely 
dependent. Thus, leading firms can reap the gains of low cost production by small ' 
enterprises, while keeping control over the entire production process. Market agents 
are the direct link between small enterprises and leading firms. In the context of 
this study, market agents are seen as 'representing' such leading firms. Market 
agents bargain with the various types of small enterprises on forward conditions 
related to specific orders. The actual forward conditions are a reflection of the 
bargaining position of distinct small enterprises. 
In analyzing vertical linkages two basic points are often overlooked. The first is that 
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vertical linkages within a marketing and production chain are not purely 
antagonistic. It is not like a game of chess in which the loss of white is the gain of 
black. Due to interdepencies within the marketing and production chain the success 
of a small enterprise lies not in overcoming market agents, but in eliciting their 
cooperation (Axelrod 1984: 190). The second point is that power differences 
between small enterprises and market agents do influence the linkage in the sense 
that the powerful pushes the powerless, as far as norms and values of reciprocity 
allow. 
The interaction between market agents and small enterprises can be analyzed within 
the framework of the New Institutional Economics, of which the transaction cost 
approach (Williamson 1975; 1985) is one of the main strands. Williamson has set 
a research agenda by presenting the market versus hierarchy dichotomy. The 
leading question in his framework is how to keep opportunistic behaviour of 
transaction partners in check; in case of 'pure' markets this is achieved through 
prices, while 'pure' hierarchies are governed solely by authority. From this starting 
point many authors have assumed a continuüm between markets and hierarchies 
(for developing countries, see Mead 1984). Nevertheless, the mainstream transaction 
costs approach claims that, in the final analysis, all forms of economie organization 
can be reduced to either market or hierarchy. 
However, several recent contributions to economie literature conclude that within 
the dichotomy it is not possible to deal satisfactorily with cooperation among firms 
in networks in which repeated transactions, in some cases leading to trust relations, 
take place.1 It has been argued that such long-term voluntary patterns of 
cooperation, both among and within firms, do not fit well in the dichotomy, nor can 
they be placed on the continuüm (Knorringa & Kox 1992). Such cooperation is first 
of all characterised by the recognition of interdependency by both transaction 
partners. This recognition, and the behaviour it instigates, leads to an essentially 
In their book on the New Institutional Economics, Zukin & DiMaggio suggest that given the 
inability of the concepts of market and hierarchy to capture the (frequent) occurrence of ongoing 
relationships of trust and mutual dependency, there is "... a need for a third ideal-type decision 
structure, based on informal social relations, parallel to markets and firms" (Zukin & DiMaggio 1990: 
9). Best (1990) and Powell (1989) argue that the dichotomy cannot capture the complexities of 
competition and institutional dynamics in real life economie exchange. Several articles collected in 
Thompson et al. (1991) come to the same conclusion. 
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distinct way of restraining opportunism, namely a degree of trust based on a 
thorough knowledge of each others situation. To be clear, this is not the type of ) 
trust based on idealism or naivety, but a trust based on the realisation by specialists < 
that they need each other in such a way, that they will also have to trast each other ) 
to some extent. In the transaction cost approach the critical issue is not that all 
actors are assumed to behave opportunistically, but that it is very costly to find out 
who will and who will not behave opportunistically (Williamson & Ouchi 1981). It 
is the presence of mutual familiarity and trust that enables a transaction partner to 
consciously take uninsured risks.2 Thus, trust lowers the transaction costs as it 
increases the predictability of the others' behaviour. 
The issue of trust becomes relevant only in case of memorized infinite repeated 
transactions. According to Zucker (1986) there are three central modes of trust 
production: (1) process based trust (trust in the behaviour of the transaction partner 
based on past or expected similar transactions, in short his business reputation), (2) 
characteristic based trust (trust is tied to the transaction partners characteristics 
such as family background or ethnicity), and (3) institutionally based trust (e.g. 
certification as an accountant or registered as a doctor). In the present framework 
especially the analytical separation of process and characteristic based trust is 
important.3 It draws out into the open a hidden difference in approaching the issue 
of trust by economists and sociologists. In literature dealing with trust most 
economists implicitly deal with process based trust (Dasgupta 1988, Mertens 1989). 
In turn, sociologists usually focus on characteristic based trust (Luhmann 1988). 
In general, trust enables voluntary cooperation. In this type of cooperation 
transaction partners have a real choice, as they consciously choose to work together 
while they also have alternative options. In real life cooperation is often enforced 
and asymmetrical. Such asymmetrical interaction is not seen as a form of 
cooperation but as hierarchical coordination. 
In short, in transaction patterns based on voluntary cooperation, opportunistic 
behaviour is restrained in a way which is essentially different from 'pure' market or 
2
 One of the few comprehensive treatments on the concept of trust can be found in Gambetta 
(1988). 
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 Although in actual fieldwork they are difficult to entangle. 
5 
hierarchical coordination. Therefore, one might perceive of three principles of 
coordination: market, hierarchy and cooperation, controlled respectively through 
prices, authority and trust (See also: Bradach & Eccles 1989; Powell 1989). The 
resulting triangle is shown in Figure 1. This triangle essentially means that any 
relation between specific actors is not characterised by either hierarchy, market or 
cooperation, but by a mix of these three. 
Figure 1. Principles of Coordination 
MARKET HIERARCHY 
COOPERATION 
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3. The footwear subsector in Agra 
(a) Overview 
The main land mark of Agra is the world famous Taj Mahal, which attracts a lot 
of tourists and makes the tourism industry the second major employer in Agra. Less 
obvious for the casual visitor is the footwear industry, the main source of livelihood 
in Agra. Agra, a city in India of 1.5 million inhabitants, is characterised by a strong 
geographical concentration of footwear manufacturers and their relevant linkage 
units, and is a very suitable location for a subsector study. The many varieties of 
footwear are produced in all sorts of enterprises: modern small-scale factories with 
conveyer beits, or traditional workshops with one or two hand-operated machines, 
or in homes with women workers, and mostly by a combination of the various types 
of producers.4 The subsector holds all kinds of specialisations, and inter-firm * 
division of labour has started to develop. The approximately 5000 production units 
are linked to each other through various types of subcontracting arrangements. 
Middlemen arrange for the smooth functioning of the system, paid on commission 
either by larger producers or traders. 
Agra has some evident system nodes. Most of the traders, of both raw materials and 
final products, are concentrated in one market area in Central Agra, Hing ki Mandi. 
Apart from this daily market there is a much cheaper place to buy materials and 
sell intermediary products, Chakipat market, which is held two mornings a week. 
Apart from these markets there are some 10 purchasing offices of large firms, either 
trading houses oriented to cheap exports or large domestic producers catering to the 
emerging middle class in India. Overall, Agra is known for its hand-made, labour-
intensive, medium and low priced, leather-upper full shoes. lts competitiveness 
depends completely on its very cheap, abundantly available and highly skilled labour 
force, working predominantly with traditional technology. 
The following working classification is used: 
- Larger workshops are units with only wage labour, employing more than 10 workers and using a mix 
of modern and traditional technology. 
- Small workshops are units with primarily wage labour, employing less than 10 persons and using 
mainly traditional technology. 
- Home based units, with a work place in or around the home, use primarily or only family labour and 
mainly traditional technology. This group includes the cottage industries. 
- Women home workers undertake labour intensive hand operations on piece rates in their homes. 
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Figure 2. Main market channels in Agra's footwear sector 
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The size of the shaded areas in Figure 2 are proportional to the employment in the 
various segments of the subsector. According to this subsector map around 60,000 
people are directly involved in the actual making of footwear, on an average 
working day outside the rainy season.5 As irregularity is the main characteristic of 
footwear production in Agra, it must be stressed that Figure 2 gives only an 
indication of the relative importance of the various segments in the subsector. 
Irregularities in orders received and consequently in employment generated, from 
season to season, but also from week to week. Due to this irregularity, production 
units can be open one week and closed the next. Another important irregularity is 
that persons involved in footwear production change roles frequently. They can be 
entrepreneurs of their family-based unit one week, unemployed the next week and 
working as hired labourer the following week. 
(b) Specific linkages between small final producers and market agents 
The case study presented in this paper focuses on transactions between small-scale 
final producers and the market agents that buy their products.6 The hypothesis is 
that the mix of market, hierarchy and cooperation is influenced by the market 
segment, in such a way that production for a higher market segment results in a mix 
that is more dominated by cooperation. 
Each letter in Figure 3 depicts an exchange relation between a small-scale final 
producer and its direct market agent. The placement of the specific linkages within 
the triangle is tentative and qualitative. 
linkage a is between the smallest household units and local wholesalers. These 
household units, based on family labour and primitive technology, produce basic 
cheap shoes with traditional designs. The head of the household goes to the market 
two or three times a week where he tries to sell to local wholesalers. Most 
wholesalers need some of those basic shoes now and then, but there are always a 
The total employment generated by the footwear industry in Agra is much larger (Knorringa 
1991). 
6
 That is not to say that other linkages, e.g. among small producers, or between small producers 
and (government) institutions, are not important (See Knorringa 1991). 
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lot of suppliers in this segment. The household units must sell, to be able to buy 
new inputs. Therefore, margins are pushed to the minimum, producers remain 
anonymous and their products are rather homogeneous. Bargaining is actually only 
on the price, as production has already been carried out. 
Figure 3. The Triangle of Coordination 
MARKET HIERARCHY 
COOPERATION 
Linkage b is between somewhat more specialised household units and small 
workshops (5 to 10 wage labourers), on the one hand, and local wholesalers, on the 
other hand. Entrepreneurs in this segment try to get orders from those local 
wholesalers. In this segment there is no longer anonymity of producers, nor 
homogeneity of products. Product specifications are discussed in advance, samples 
are made, quality of the product is higher, quantities are larger, and payments are 
no longer in cash. In short, both actors invest in their mutual linkage. A certain 
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degree of trust develops over time, but as there are still a large number of 
techmcally competitive suppliers, the price mechamsm remains dominant in most 
cases. 
Linkages of the types a and b exist already for decades in Agra (Lynch 1969, Leest 
1984). More recently developed linkages are those of type c and d. These deal with 
linkages between larger workshops (10 to 50 wage labourers) and purchasing offices 
of large companies. Although officially these larger workshops remain independent 
firms, authority and hierarchy play an important role. Managers of such purchasing 
offices regard their suppliers as subordinates and the entrepreneurs of these 
workshops comply to that expectation. Producers are of ten pushed into exclusivity 
arrangements. The managers of such purchasing offices are, in turn, subordinated 
to their head office in Bombay, Delhi or Calcutta. There are two types of large 
companies with purchasing offices in Agra. 
In linkage c the market agent is the purchasing office of one of the large trading 
houses in India, that focus on cheap exports without any specific know-how in the 
field of leather and footwear. This refers to footwear of $15 to 20 in a European 
retail shop. Linkage c is dominated by hierarchy, within the context of exports based 
on low quality, cheap imitations. 
In linkage d the market agent is the purchasing office(r) of one of the large Indian 
footwear companies (Bata, Corona, Liberty). These companies hardly produce any 
of their cheaper varieties themselves any more. An important difference with 
linkage c is that these companies do have a lot of footwear know-how, and that they 
have large distribution networks and brand-name goodwill in India. Within the Agra 
context you are among the elite if you can say that you are already a steady supplier 
of Bata for 10 years or so. That proves you are a reliable partner that delivers a 
constant high quality. Moreover, through your Bata contacts you are aware of the 
latest technological and marketing developments. In the case of d, much more than 
with c, the hierarchy gives way to a linkage in which trust has become more 
important. 
The next linkage shown in Figure 3 is that of type e. This linkage deals with the 
modern small direct exporters (25 to 100 wage labourers). Entrepreneurs of such 
enterprises themselves go to international leather fairs with their latest designs and 
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try to establish contacts with buyers for retail chains. The shoes are priced between 
$ 75 and 100 in the shop. Entrepreneurs maintain direct telepfaone and fax contact 
with Frankfort and Paris. In the eyes of the European and American buyers the 
most crucial characteristic of an Indian supplier in this market segment is nis 
reliability; that he supplies what he promised. And not, as often happens in linkage 
c, using inferior materials or shaky stitching work on the second or third delivery. 
In short, linkage e evolves around trust. Of course, price plays a role and the 
linkage is not free from authority feelings, but the dominant factor is the realisation 
of the need for mutual trust. 
The last type of linkage shown in Figure 3, type f, deals with small-scale units that 
are independent only on paper.7 Each of the five large production firms in Agra is 
composed of 8 to 10 small-scale production units, sometimes located in one or two 
buildings. While ownership is centralised, each production unit can be seen as a 
separate production line. Therefore, linkage type f is a text-book example of 
hierarchy. These large firms produce both for export (medium market segment) and 
for the domestic market (high market segment). 
At this point it is important to note that by far most producers face linkages without 
a significant degree of trust. Only some 25 small-scale units (0.5% of all small 
production units) transact with market agents in the way depicted by linkage type 
e. Approximately 2% of all small production units work for one of the large Indian 
footwear companies (linkage type d), where trust also plays an important role. The 
large majority of the small producers in the Agra cluster face linkages dominated 
by the market mechanism: linkage type a (35%), or b (55%). The remaining 7.5% 
of the small production units in Agra face linkages dominated by hierarchy (type 
c and f). 
Voluntary cooperation is usually found only in the higher market segments. In Agra, 
however, only a few small production units are oriented towards these higher 
market segments. By far most small production units face linkages dominated either 
by price or authority considerations, and cannot benefit from trust. 
For tax and subsidy purposes. 
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(c) The socio-cultural chasm that frustrates characteristic based trust 
Apart from the varying degrees of trust in specific linkages there is also a more 
general dividing line especially on the issue of characteristic based trust. The two 
main socio-cultural groups involved in the industry, traditionally skilled artisans and 
commercially trained entrepreneurs, do not communicate unless they must. This 
frustrates the development of characteristic based trust between 'makers' and 
'sellers'. 
In India, the people involved in trade and production of footwear are from a 
different caste background. Trade and management is dominated by Hindus from 
forward castes while the actual making of footwear is a sub-caste specific occupation 
in the sense that only those bom as Chamars "can occupy the status of shoe maker 
without breaking caste rules." (Lynch 1969: 15). In the traditional caste system, 
Chamars are close to the bottom of the hierarchy because they work with a 
polluting object, leather, and because they are reputed to eat beef, the most 
polluting of foods according to orthodox Hinduism (Khare 1984, Sharma 1986). In 
Agra footwear workers are predominantly Jatavs, a subgroup of the Chamars. Jatavs 
are treated roughly and with disdain by forward caste Hindus and contacts are kept 
to an absolute minimum. There are no linkages between Jatavs and forward caste 
Hindus in which characteristic based trust plays a role. 
This poses an important constraint on the options of development of characteristic 
based trust relations between traders and entrepreneurs of production units. 
Linkage type a, between household units and local traders, represents the classical 
case of the (Jatav) master artisan dealing with the forward caste trader. 
Entrepreneurs of production units that face linkage type b are from various 
backgrounds. They are, firstly, the more successful artisans, often more 'separated' 
from involvement in direct production, who run small and some larger workshops, 
and, secondly, trader-entrepreneurs, originating from footwear trading communities. 
Entrepreneurs of production units that market their products to the purchasing 
offices of export trading houses (linkage type c), are predominantly young educated 
middle class males, without any significant experience in footwear trade or 
production. Most of them have a degree in Commerce and they have entered the 
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industry with the expectation of the heaps of gold to be earned from exporting 
cheap leather-uppef footwear. This background is similar to most of the staff 
members at those trading-house purchasing offices. Next are the entrepreneurs of 
production units that market their produce to the purchasing offices of the large 
Indian footwear companies (linkage type d). They have either a commercial or an 
engineering background and are well-established and experienced in the industry, 
as are their counterparts, the staff members of these Bata, Corona or Liberty 
purchasing offices. Linkage type e, the only linkage where the entrepreneur of the 
small production unit deals directly with foreign buyers, requires trust to get started 
in the first place. Thus, the people involved in this linkage already knew and trusted 
each other, and that enabled the linkage to emerge. 
So, characteristic based trust is likely to be present in linkage type c, d and e. It can 
sometimes be found in linkage type b, but it is always absent in linkage type a. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The subsector approach to small enterprise promotion and research is a good 
analytical device. In this paper an attempt has been made to incorporate trust 
within this approach. Trust is only a means to an end, and not an end in itself. Trust 
strengthens voluntary cooperation which, in turn, fosters innovations of all kinds. In 
small enterprise promotion and research we are always on the look out for ways to 
stimulate innovative behaviour in small enterprises. In this regard the development 
of trust in vertical linkages within the subsector is crucial. The case study shows that 
a) trust becomes more important in linkages oriented to higher market segments, 
and b) a social-cultural chasm can frustrate the development of characteristic based 
trust, which might block further innovations. 
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